Impact of Post-Quantum Cryptography on TLS Protocols

The problem with static machine identity

Ever wonder why your security dashboard says everything is fine while a silent breach is draining your data? It’s because we’re still treating machine identities like human ones—and it’s just not working anymore.

The reality is that traditional IAM is basically a "bouncer" who only checks IDs at the door but never watches what happens at the bar. Once a workload gets its token, it can often do whatever it wants until that token expires.

The scale of non-human identities has completely outpaced our ability to manage them. Here are the big reasons why the old way is failing:

• Static keys are "forever" permissions: Most tools just check if a secret or certificate is valid. They don’t care if a retail inventory bot suddenly starts querying payroll databases in another region.
• The explosion of automated workloads: We’re seeing a massive jump in service accounts. According to the CyberArk 2024 Identity Security Threat Landscape Report, machine identities are now the primary target for attackers, with some organizations managing 40 times more machine identities than human ones.
• Permission Bloat: In industries like finance or healthcare, developers often grant "admin" or "full-access" to an API just to get it working. That gap between what it can do and what it actually does is where the risk lives.

Take a healthcare app that processes patient records. If the workload identity is static, an attacker stealing those credentials can move laterally across the whole cloud environment because the system only sees a "valid" key. It doesn't notice that the behavior is totally weird.

So, how do we move past just checking IDs? We have to look at how these workloads actually behave in real-time.

Defining runtime profiling for workloads

So, we’ve established that just checking a "passport" at the cloud gateway isn't enough. Runtime profiling is basically building a digital "pattern of life" for your workloads so you actually know what's normal and what's a red flag.

Think of a baseline as a fingerprint for how a specific service acts when nobody is messing with it. You aren't just looking at the identity; you're watching the actual execution.

• API Traffic and Frequency: A retail checkout service usually talks to a payment gateway and a database. If it suddenly starts making 1,000 calls a minute to an internal HR portal, something is broken or hijacked.
• Network and Geo-Origin: Most microservices are homebodies. If a finance app that always runs in us-east-1 suddenly initiates a connection from an IP in a region where you don't even have customers, that’s an immediate alert.
• Resource Fingerprinting: This is about knowing which files, environment variables, and sockets a process touches. In a linux environment, you can track this using tools like eBPF to see exactly what the kernel is doing for that specific workload.

The real value here is catching "identity drift." This happens when a service account starts doing things its developers never intended.

In a real-world finance setup, you might have a "read-only" auditor bot. If that bot suddenly tries to call a DeleteBucket API or starts downloading gigabytes of data to an external endpoint (data egress spike), your profiling tool should kill that session instantly. It’s like having EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response) but specifically for the identity layer.

Next, we’ll look at how to actually bake these policies into your deployment pipeline so you aren't just playing catch-up.

Implementing a lifecycle approach

Honestly, trying to manage machine identities without a framework is like trying to build a skyscraper without a blueprint. You might get a few floors up, but eventually, the whole thing’s gonna lean.

When we talk about a lifecycle approach, we aren't just talking about rotating keys every 90 days. It's about governing the entire "birth-to-death" process of a workload.

I’ve spent a lot of time looking at how different teams handle this, and most are just winging it. That is why I’m a big fan of the work coming out of the Non-Human Identity Management Group.

• Inventory and Discovery: You can't secure what you don't see. The first step is always finding those hidden service accounts and "shadow" APIs that developers spun up for a weekend project three years ago.
• Classification and Risk Scoring: Not all identities are equal. We score risk based on data sensitivity (accessing PII vs. public logs) and privilege levels (Read-only vs. Delete permissions). A bot that can wipe a database gets a much higher score than one that just reads a config file.
• Continuous Lifecycle Management: This is the "runtime" part. You need to automate the decommissioning of identities the second a workload is retired.

According to the Non-Human Identity Management Group (NHIMG), which provides independent research and best-practice guidance for workload identity, organizations need to move toward a "zero-standing privileges" model for machine actors. This means identities should only have permissions when they’re actually running.

I've seen this go wrong in retail environments during peak seasons. A company spins up 500 extra containers to handle holiday traffic, but then they forget to kill the associated IAM roles when the containers scale back down. Those "ghost" identities are an attacker's dream.

By collaborating with the community at nhimg.org, security leaders can stay ahead of these emerging risks. It’s better than learning the hard way after a breach, right?

Next, we’ll dive into how to actually automate these responses so you aren't waking up at 3 AM for every weird API call.

Technical hurdles and how to jump them

So, we've talked about the "why" and the "what," but let’s get real—actually doing this is a pain in the neck. You can’t just flip a switch and suddenly have perfect runtime profiles for ten thousand microservices that change every time a dev sneezes.

How do you profile a container that only lives for ten minutes? If you’re waiting for a "baseline" to form over a week, that workload is long gone before you even know what it was supposed to do.

The trick is moving the profiling further left. You gotta define the identity profile in the CI/CD pipeline itself—basically "pre-baking" what the workload is allowed to do before it ever hits production. But, the actual enforcement and telemetry collection still happens at runtime (Shift Right) using things like eBPF or Service Mesh to watch the traffic.

• Service Mesh Telemetry: Tools like Istio or Linkerd are lifesavers here. They capture identity-to-identity traffic without you having to bake agents into every single container image.
• eBPF for the Win: Since you can’t always trust the app, you watch the kernel. It’s the only way to see if a "temporary" retail worker bot is suddenly trying to open a raw socket to an unknown IP.

Automated Orchestration and SOAR

To really scale this, you need automated incident response. This is where SOAR (Security Orchestration, Automation, and Response) comes in. You can also use Kubernetes admission controllers—like Kyverno or OPA—to literally kill a pod the second it drifts from its pre-baked profile. If a container starts running a process it shouldn't, the controller just deletes it.

Here is a quick look at how you might pull telemetry from a sidecar to check for drift:

# This function handles the actual response, like revoking a 
# session token in Vault or scaling a K8s deployment to zero 
# to stop the attack in its tracks.
def trigger_remediation(workload_id):
    print(f"Executing lockdown for {workload_id}...")
    # Logic to revoke tokens or kill pods goes here

def check_identity_drift(current_api_calls, baseline_profile):
    for call in current_api_calls:
        if call not in baseline_profile['allowed_endpoints']:
            print(f"Alert: Unexpected access to {call['path']} detected!")
            trigger_remediation(call['workload_id'])
            return True
    return False

We’re moving toward a world where secrets don't live in env variables anymore. The goal is continuous authentication—where the workload has to prove who it is every single time it talks to another service.

• Short-lived tokens: If a token only lasts 15 minutes, the blast radius of a leak is tiny.
• Automated Response: If the runtime profile sees a finance app suddenly trying to hit a dev database, the system should just kill the pod. No human in the loop, no 3 am wake-up calls.

As established by the Datadog data mentioned earlier, the massive gap in unused permissions is our biggest enemy. By shifting to a model where identities are validated against their actual behavior—not just their credentials—we finally close that door.

Honestly, it’s about architectural sustainability. We can't hire enough people to watch these machines, so we have to make the machines watch themselves. It's the only way to keep the cloud from becoming a total Wild West.